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Abstract: The paper is conceptual in nature and provides insight into the ongoing research on electronic governance. 
The core argument developed in this paper is that the rapid development of information and communication 
technologies in the last twenty years has given rise to a paradigm shift of how collective problems are being solved in 
the future. The research presented in this paper builds on the Electronic Market Hypothesis developed by Malone at 
al. (1987) and provides empirical evidence from federated identity development. The paper thus contributes to 
academic theory development of electronic governance and reduces the current confusion of what electronic 
governance is or might be. 
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1. Introduction 
The claim we want to make in this paper is based on two assumptions. First, governance is regarded as 
the process of collective problem solving, which involves various kinds of actors and which takes place 
across multiple hierarchic (e.g., organizational, political) levels. Second, governance issues arise within or 
across corporate boundaries and are thus embedded in an institutional environment, which provides the 
formal and informal rules of how social, political, and economic interaction is executed. (North 1991) 
Although there is no clear empirical evidence available, the following paragraph thus claims that due to 
the rapid rise of information and communication technology a governance paradigm shift can be 
observed. 
2. The traditional governance paradigm 
2.1 About Markets and Hierarchies 
Back in 1987, Malone et al. have developed the Electronic Market Hypothesis (EMH). They have studied 
the two basic economic mechanisms of coordinating flows of material or services and concluded that the 
increasing use of information and communication technology leads to a shift towards more market use to 
coordinate economic activity. The reason for that lies in the capability of information technology to 
significantly reduce coordination costs, which were considered as being the key determinant regarding 
the form of organizing economic activity. In the EMH Malone et al. identified two key variables of 
coordination costs, namely asset specificity and complex product description. While asset specificity 
refers to the degree of complexity which needs to be coped with when a particular asset is subject of 
transaction, complexity of product description refers to the degree of information required to specify the 
attributes of the product. The two variables have been chosen since they are very likely to be affected by 
information and communication technology. They argue that coordination is mostly about communication 
and processing information, which obviously is the core of information and communication technology. 
Accordingly, Malone et al. state that “coordination costs include the transaction (or governance) costs of 
all the information processing necessary to coordinate the work of people and machines that perform the 
primary processes” (1987:485). 
The transposition of this argumentation from the impact of ICT on coordinating economic activity to the 
impact of ICT on governance brings up the following results. 
2.2 Complexity of product description 
In the Electronic Market Hypothesis, complexity of product description is referred to as the complexity of 
gathering the information which are required to identify the attributes of the product or asset which is 
subject of transaction. 
 
In governance, the subject of transaction is the collective problem which is being worked on in order to 
solve it. Attributes of such problem solving are per definition actor and level. While the actor-attribute 
represents the values such as companies, government agencies, trans-national corporations, or simply 
citizens, the level-attribute contains values such as regional, national, or above-national in the political 
sense of levels. A third attribute of governance is function. The objective of introducing the function-
attribute is to stress the fact that collective problem solving processes are always embedded in a 
functional context. (Finger and Pécoud 2003) This means that collective problems can for instance occur 
in the delivery of public services or in the regulation of such service delivery. The function-attribute thus 
refers to three distinct values, namely policy-making, regulation and service delivery. 
In summary, the original variable of complexity product description can be applied to characterize 
governance, or in other words collective problem solving, in the same manner as it is applied in the 
Electronic Market Hypothesis. The complexity issue remains the same as well. The more actors and 
levels are involved in collective problem solving, the more difficult it is to uncover the fundamental 
architecture of the problem. 
2.3 Asset Specificity 
In terms of asset specificity, the Electronic Market Hypothesis refers to the degree of complexity which 
needs to be coped with when a particular asset is subject of transaction. The objective of this section is to 
examine how asset specificity is reflected in collective problem solving. 
 
According to Williamson (1981) asset specificity is high, if a manufacturing firm cannot simply make use 
of machines or resources used in the production process of a third party manufacturing firm. The asset 
would thus be physically specific. Another kind of asset specificity mentioned by Malone et al. is time 
specificity (1987), which means that the value of an asset is strongly dependent on time. In transaction 
cost theory, Williamson (1981:568) stated that “transactions differ so greatly and efficiency is realized only 
if governance structures are tailored to the specific needs of each type of transaction.” Therefore, when 
looking at governance, complexity of product description refers to the complexity of describing what the 
collective problem is all about, while asset specificity refers to the approach of solving the collective 
problem as a function of the collective problem’s specificity. In other words, the more specific the 
collective problem is, the more is it difficult to solve the collective problem. The approach of collective 
problem solving, which is presented in this paper strongly relies on the concepts of organizational and 
institutional theory, as well as in transaction cost theory. (Malone et al. 1987, Williamson 1991, Roberts 
and Greenwood 1997) According to the second assumption mentioned earlier, we therefore identify two 
key approaches of how collective problems can be solved, namely organizational and institutional 
change. 
 
Currently, organizational change is the standard approach of collective problem solving within 
organizations, because such problems are strongly related to the operational processing of transactions 
within and across corporate boundaries. As argued in transaction cost theory, the basic unit of analysis is 
the transaction within the organization where at least two actors are involved. When it comes to a 
disturbance of such transactions, collective problems emerge. Such problems are usually solved by 
locating the disturbance, identifying alternative designs, and finally adopt promising organizational 
designs. (Williamson 1992, Klein and Shelanski 1995) 
 
A major critique of the transaction cost approach towards collective problem solving is that it does not 
take into account the institutional environment of an organization where such collective problem solving 
occurs. Therefore, institutional theory provides an alternative approach for collective problem solving, 
which, albeit being in the same dimension, is independent from the transaction cost theory approach. 
Oliver (1991) argues that institutional theory in contrast to transaction cost theory has a greater focus on 
the impact of non-choice behavior, such as the exercise of habit, convention, convenience, or social 
obligation, on the organization. Roberts and Greenwood (1997) thus argued that by integrating 
transaction cost and institutional theory the shortcomings of both theories can be overcome. They outline 
that collective problem solving is strongly influenced by pre- and postconscious institutionalization. 
According to their theory, decision-making is either influenced by the institutional environment where 
formal and informal rules are taken for granted (preconscious) or by tangible forces that lead to a strong 
dependency of decision-making from powerful institutional rules (postconscious). Hence, institutional 
change is the second promising approach next to organizational change to accomplish collective problem 
solving. Institutional change is hereby referred to as the change of pre- and postconscious formal and 
informal rules of social, political, and economic interaction. 
2.4 Nomenclature Verification and Wrap Up 
Although derived from the Electronic Market Hypothesis, the two key variables asset specificity and 
complexity of product description are renamed in the following. These name change is necessary to make 
the analytical framework of the new governance paradigm presented later in this paper more self-
explanatory. Asset specificity thus turns into problem specificity and complexity of product description 
turns into complexity of problem description. The attributes of each variable though remain the same. The 
attributes of problem specificity are organizational and institutional. The attributes of complexity of 
problem description are actor, level, and function.  
2.5 The analytical framework 
The key argument of the Electronic Market Hypothesis (EMH) is that information and communication 
technologies are decreasing costs of coordinating economic activities (Malone et al. 1987). While markets 
are preferably used to coordinate economic activities with a relatively low level of coordination costs, 
hierarchies are the major means to integrate economic activities with a high level of coordination costs. 
Hence, a shift toward proportionally more market use can be observed, since operations are becoming 
more efficient and less coordination effort is required. 
The analytical framework to describe and explain the new governance paradigm closely builds on the 
analytical framework of EMH. As mentioned earlier, governance is characterized through the two 
variables problem specificity and complexity of problem description. The two variables are independent 
and taken together they represent the framework to analyze governance, or in other words collective 
problem solving. 
 
Figure 1: Problem Attributes Affect the Governance Paradigm 
 
As described in Figure 1, the key difference between the traditional and the new governance paradigm is 
that the complexity of problem description and the specificity of the problem. In the sense of collective 
problem solving, the traditional governance paradigm is characterized by a relatively low level of problem 
complexity, which can be solved by applying means of organizational change or design adoption, while 
the new governance paradigm emerges from complex collective problems which are embedded in the 
institutional environment of the organization. Problem solving can thus only be achieved by touching the 
institutional framework in general, and the formal and informal rules for interaction in detail. 
The classical question of “make or buy” represents a problem statement which is relevant for all 
stakeholders of the firm. It is thus a collective problem involving various actors (e.g., employees and 
managers), interacting on and across different hierarchical levels (e.g., lower, middle, upper and top 
management), and possessing various functions (e.g., controlling, manufacturing, corporate strategy). 
Although it is an important issue to decide on, the collective problem can be solved purely by changing 
organizational processes and structures. The institutional environments of the firm or the formal and 
informal rules within the company are only slightly affected. In contrast, the implementation of sustainable 
change in the public sector requires a new paradigm of governance. As current research and experiences 
from the “field” have broad up, public sector reform is a complex issue. It involves a multitude of actors on 
diverse levels across all the functions of the state. (Finger 2003) Although the problems and issues have 
been localized, the approach of solving them is not found on the organizational level. It is rather the 
institutional foundation of the public sector which needs to be subject of change. 
3. The New Governance Paradigm – Empirical Evidence from Federated Identity 
Management 
The objective of the following paragraph is to develop the foundations of the new governance paradigm. 
This will be done by studying the case of federated identity development closely aligned to the analytical 
framework developed in the previous chapter. 
3.1 The Development of Federated Identity Management  
Both in government and business, data exchange is gaining importance and thus the relevance of 
usernames, passwords and other personal data that users have to enter into a variety of inter- and 
intranet pages. The interacting entities are challenged to create more intimate and highly secure 
relationships. A rapidly emerging approach to ensure a consistent exchange of personalized data is 
known as Federated Identity Management (FIM). FIM is the management of identities between corporate 
boundaries and aims at providing the possibility to conduct business transactions in a secure and 
seamless environment. Through FIM, organizations can cost-effectively manage the myriad of corporate 
and individual identities that are essential to accomplish such transactions – both within corporate 
boundaries as well as with external partners or customers. 
3.1.1 From Intra-Firm Organization to Circles of Trust  
According to insiders, the evolution of federated identity can be compared to the evolution of the Internet. 
(Hofmann, 2005) They stress that the current state of Federated Identity Management is very close to the 
early days of the Internet, where electronic collaboration between organizations was a very costly and 
rigid business. If two companies wanted to share data, they needed to purchase a leased line from a 
service provider between the two of them. If even more companies wanted to join the resulting mesh of 
connections was complex, extremely costly, and difficult to manage. The next development step of 
networking collaboration was the existence of bundled offerings form telephone companies across their 
private switched networks on a per collaborative project basis. Today, there is an open cloud of the 
Internet with Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that provide secure networking tunnels to allow far simpler 
and cheaper collaboration between organizations. However, the whole construct only works due to the 
fact that Internet Service Provider (ISP) agreed on common standards (TCP/IP). 
 
There is a direct analogy between the current state of federated identity development and the early 
stages of the internet. If resources shall be shared on a network with different applications and people 
from different organizations, their identities have to be managed either directly or federated. Hence, the 
resulting identity mesh is very similar to the mesh created through the early stages of collaborative 
networking. Federated identity helps to overcome this problem. Instead of maintaining discrete identity 
stores, collaborating organizations can choose to trust one another’s users by establishing explicit one-to-
one trust relationships between each other. Hence, identity management separates from resource 
management. The result of this separation process is a federated identity mesh, which is called a Circle 
of Trust (CoT). It is composed of organizations providing resources and organizations managing the 
digital identities, the so called Digital Identity Providers (Project Liberty 2005).  
3.1.2 From Circles of Trust to Federated Identity Internet  
Among experts, the final step of identity management evolution is the creation of the so called federated 
identity internet. Albeit not yet existing, experts are convinced that this new form of federated identity 
management will emerge. So far, the federated identity internet is foreseen as a cloud, which is based 
upon standards that are transparent to end-users, but rely on the collaboration of the Digital Identity 
Providers (IdP) in the same way as Internet Service Providers collaborate today. (Nesbitt, 2005) The 
important shift from the CoTs to this new form of Federated Identity Management is the consolidation of 
multiple CoTs into one single entity. Instead of having the digital identities of the users stored in one 
database of the Circle of Trust’s IdP, they are simultaneously spread over and federated across the data 
storage of each IdP in the resulting federated identity internet. 
 
The organizational form, resulting from this development, cannot be distinguished clearly as a hierarchy, 
a network, or a market. The resource providers have a network form of relation to the identity providers, 
while at the same time the exchange of identity information among the identity providers leads to the 
development of a more market-oriented relationship between the IdPs. To close the sketch, the further 
development and exploitation of Federated Identity Management will remain in the hands of a hierarchical 
organization, such as the Liberty Alliance. 
3.2 Theorizing Practice – The New Governance Paradigm 
The objective of the following paragraph is to examine the case of federated identity development 
according to the analytical framework. The analysis will be focused on two transformation steps: (1) the 
step from intre-firm organization of identity management to the creation to the circles of trust, and (2) the 
step from the circles of trust to the development of the federated identity internet. In the analysis the 
coordination cost argument will be applied according to the argumentation in the Electronic Market 
Hypothesis. 
3.2.1 From Hierarchic to Networked Organization of Identity Management   
Coming back to the definition of governance, the collective problem in this step is securing seamless web 
transaction users and service providers. The problem is collective because it affects not only the 
providers of such web transactions, but also the users demanding more efficient handling of identity 
management. Collective problem solving is thus the approach of how the issue of secure and seamless 
identity management is achieved. 
In order to not complicate the analysis the analytical framework will be applied to the question of what are 
the various interests of the actors involved in shaping identity management in terms of coordination costs. 
The analysis is restricted to the study of how the different development statuses affect the coordination 
costs of the identity provider (IdP), the service provider (SP), and the end user (EU).  
 
Status Complexity of The Problem Description Problem Specificity 
“Silo” 
Solution 
IdP n/a n/a 
 SP The service provider has to cope with 
a relatively high amount of production 
and coordination costs, since he has 
to take care of research, 
development, maintenance, security 
provisioning and bug fixing. In terms 
of trust development, service 
providers have to take big efforts to 
build trust with their clients. 
Although the provision of identity 
management can be improved/efficiency 
increased through organizational (e.g., 
process) change, the bigger impact can 
be achieved through externalization of 
identity provision. (Æ institutional change) 
 EU Coordination and transaction costs 
are high for the end-user. The end-
user has different identities for 
different kinds of web-transactions. 
The costs of maintaining and 
In terms of operational change, the end-
user has not options. He is forced to cope 
with the high diversity of digital identities. 
The only choice he has is “institutional”. 
He can either cope with the situation or 
safeguarding the digital identities are 
thus high. 
reject web-transactions in total. In doing 
so, he avoids having diverse digital 
identities. 
 
The driving force of change is thus the pressure of service providers to significantly reduce their costs of 
managing digital identities. The costs are both, coordination and production costs. Due to information and 
communication technology that enable a secure, seamless, and efficient exchange of digital identity data, 
the Circles of Trust can be realized as a reaction to the increasing costs of maintaining “silo” solutions for 
identity management.  
 
Status Complexity of The Problem Description Problem Specificity 
Circle of 
Trust 
IdP The costs of managing digital identity in 
the IdPs are lower than the costs the 
service providers had in the stage of 
“silo” solutions. However, with an 
increasing size of a Circle of Trust, the 
coordination costs are rising for IdPs, 
since the various standards and 
requirements of each service provider 
has to be taken into account.   
The rise in coordination costs can mainly 
be lessened through effective 
organization of identity management. The 
key issue of the problem is thus rather 
operational design adoption than 
institutional change. 
 SP Due to centralized identity providers, 
the service providers can tremendously 
lower their costs of identity 
management. However, the 
coordination costs of maintaining the 
quality of the circle of trust in terms of 
partners, security standards are 
increasing. 
The newly emerging coordination costs 
are due to the organizational set-up of 
Circles of Trust and to the underlying 
rules and regulations (e.g., trust and 
security). Such coordination costs can 
thus be reduced through institutional 
change, because operational change is 
more related to increasing efficiency of 
transactions among the partners in such 
as circle of trust.  
 EU Due to the circles of trust, the end user 
can reduce his coordination costs, since 
for a group of web-transaction only on 
digital identity is required. 
The specificity of the collective problem 
the end-users no have is much less 
specific. Through operational change in 
terms of personal digital identity 
management, the coordination costs can 
be reduced significantly. The costs of 
institutional change, in other words the 
costs of rejecting web-based transactions, 
are much higher than simply optimizing 
the organization of their personal digital 
identities. 
 
The value proposition of organizing into the so called Circles of Trust is mainly about the reduction of 
coordination costs in terms of identity management development, provision and maintenance. Due to the 
development of information technology this institutional change from hierarchic organization to a more 
networked form of identity management is possible. Information technology provides the tools and means 
to on the one hand provide secure and seamless identity management and on the other hand information 
technology provides the means to strengthen the relationship among the partners of the network. 
In summary, the change from internal organization of identity management to the externalization of 
identity management was due to institutional change. The driver of this change was the capability of 
information and communication technology to significantly reduce the coordination costs of identity and 
service providers on the one hand and on the other hand to maintain the fundamental requirements end-
users are having in terms of security, trust, and convenience. Looking at the institutional change, the 
following observation can be made. 
 
Figure 2: The Paradigm Shift from Hierarchy to a Biased Hierarchy 
 
The starting point was a strong hierarchic organization. Identity management was internalized within the 
service providing organizations. The new organizational form (Circle of Trust) represents a thus a 
governance shift. The total amount of coordination costs for identity management could be reduced 
significantly, although the central IdP is faced with new forms of coordination costs. The resulting 
construct is though not a network, but a much less strict hierarchic organization. While the relationship of 
the Circle of Trust partners is characterized by network governance, the overall governance of such a 
Circle of Trust is still hierarchic, although in a less rigid manner compared to the “silo” stage.  
3.2.2 Towards an Amorphous Form of Governance   
According to the case study the second step in the development of a identity management is the 
transformation of the Circles of Trust into the so called Federated Identity Internet. Although this 
transformation has not started yet, there is some coordination cost based evidence observable. 
 
Status Complexity of The Problem Description Problem Specificity 
Circle of 
Trust 
IdP While both the size of the Circles of 
Trust and the amount of the Circles of 
Trusts are growing steadily, various 
new forms of coordination costs 
emerge. On the one hand, the IdPs of 
each Circle of Trust are challenged to 
provide secure, seamless, and 
performing identity management 
solutions. On the other hand the 
growing size of such Circles of Trust 
increases the costs of coordinating 
varying standards and requirements of 
each service provider.  
In terms of coordinating the various 
formats, standards, and requirements 
which the service providers are asking for, 
organizational changes (e.g., 
standardization) can reduce costs. 
Although such changes correlate 
positively with the performance in the 
emerging competition among the Circles 
of Trust, it is only institutional change 
(e.g., creating networks, alliances or 
partners), which significantly reduces 
such competition related costs. 
 SP The driving force of coordination costs 
in circles of trust is the continuous effort 
of the service providers to maintain the 
quality and the reputation of the Circle 
of Trust they are member in. Identity 
management and trust is a very user 
sensitive topic. Service providers are 
thus highly interested in keeping the 
reputation and the quality of services 
high. This in turn drives coordination 
costs. 
Although organizational optimization can 
enhance the quality of services, the 
overall reputation and the quality of the 
Circle of Trust in total strongly depends 
on the competitive performance. The 
costs of maintaining this competition are 
thus very high. A cost reducing approach 
can only be found in institutional change. 
When the different service providers in 
the different Circles of Trust team up to 
become partners in terms of competitor, 
the costs of maintaining the competition 
can be reduced to almost zero. 
 EU Albeit being on a low level, the costs of 
managing their digital identities for end-
users still remain on a considerable 
level. The diversity of Circles of Trust 
requires having various digital identities. 
From an end-user perspective, the 
organizational change approach is most 
likely. By effectively managing the digital 
identities, the costs of switching between 
various Circles of Trust is much less high 
then the costs of rejecting web 
transactions. 
 
The complexity of the problem description is becoming higher. The driver of change is thus the reduction 
of coordination costs in each Circle of Trust. Competition within and across the Circles of Trust is even 
increasing such coordination costs. 
 




IdP In this final scenario, the objective of 
each IdP is to outsource the costs of 
federated identity management to the 
markets among the IdPs. Each IdP is 
further interested in getting 
remunerated for the quality of digital 
identities he is bringin into the market 
according to the mechanisms of supply 
and demand. 
The collective problem of IdPs in this 
scenario is a different one as in the circle 
of trust scenario. IdPs are more interested 
in effectively participating in the emerging 
market of identity federation. The major 
means to solve this problem is 
organizational design adoption according 
to comparative-efficiency competition. 
 SP In this scenario, service providers are 
less interested in having a strong IdP. 
They will put there effort in their core 
business, which is the provision of web-
transaction. The coordination costs of 
establishing effective identity 
management have thus been reduced 
to almost zero.  
The collective problem of service 
providers in this scenarios has shifted 
from how to organize identity 
management, back to the question of how 
to team up with other service providers in 
order to use synergies for the core 
business.  
 EU In a federated Identity Internet the end-
user has zero coordination costs in 
terms of managing his personal digital 
identity. 
There is no need to change for end-users. 
 
In summary, the shift from Circles of Trust to a Federated Identity Management reveals an interesting 
phenomenon. 
 
Figure 3: From Market to Biased Market and From Networks to Biased Networks 
 
While the Federated Identity Internet emerges as a market among IdPs, the former members of 
competing circles of trust are creating networks and partnerships to improve their core business. Albeit 
being connected to the former ties of the Circle of Trust, the relationships among the services providers 
becomes more network oriented. The whole system as a total though, can be looked at as a hierarchic 
organization. This organization is characterized by a clear separation of identity management and service 
provision, which only work as a whole (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The Blurring of Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks 
The claim this paper wants to make is thus funded in the blurring of the definition of markets, hierarchies, 
and networks. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The paper conceptually drafted the further development of the Electronic Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
developed by Malone et al. (1987). The derived analytical framework claims that the use of information 
and communication technology in governance will lead to a paradigm change in collective problem 
solving. To provide empirical evidence for this claim, the case of Federated Identity Management 
evolution was studied. Each step in this evolution process was studied according to the two key variables 
of the analytical framework, namely problem specificity and complexity of problem description. The issue 
of managing federated identity was identified as the collective problem. The question of how to organize 
Federated Identity Management from a coordination cost point of view represented the approach of 
solving the collective problem. The analysis has thus revealed that the active use of information 
technology in governance, leads to the blurring of the traditional institutions of governance. Hierarchies 
turned out to be only biased hierarchies, because they contained elements of markets and networks at 
the same time. The same observation was made for markets and networks. 
In summary, the paper claims that information and communication technology is not only driving 
organizational design adoption as it was state by various scholars (Malone et al. 1987, Roberts and 
Greenwood 1997, Williamson 1991). If collective problems are becoming really complex and the 
approach to overcome the collective problem is no more of pure organizational nature in the sense of 
organizational design adoption, then a new governance paradigm is required to solve the collective 
problem (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Revealing the New Governance Paradigm 
 
As shown in the case of federated identity development, the answer for what this new governance 
paradigm is all about has been an amorphous form of hierarchy, market, and network governance. 
To conclude, we want to state that much more systematic and empirical research is required to confirm 
this claim, although we are convinced that information and communication technology have a 
transformative potential not only in terms of organizational design adoption, but also in terms of 
institutional change. 
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